Developments and Prospects of Profit Sharing and Employee Share Ownership in Europe

 

Paper for COG Fix Globalization Conference Oct. 9-11, 2002 and Trans-Atlantic Employee Ownership Conference Oct. 6-8, 2002

 

By Erik Poutsma

Nijmegen School of Management

University of Nijmegen

P.O. Box 9108

NL-6500 HK Nijmegen

The Netherlands

Tel. +31 24 3615628

Fax +31 24 3611933

e.poutsma@nsm.kun.nl

 

 

Abstract

 

The main objective of this contribution is to provide an account of the development of what has been called PEPPER in the nineties. PEPPER is an acronym used by the European Commission  that stands for Promotion of Employee Participation in Profit and Enterprise Results (including equity). This paper is based on a review of available international research and publications and interviews with country-experts. It makes an attempt to present a systematic overview of existing forms of employee financial participation and the preconditions for its existence. Special attention is given to the policies of European Member Governments  and the views of social partners that support or hinder the development of financial participation in Europe.

 

 


Developments and Prospects of Profit Sharing and Employee Share Ownership

 

1. Introduction

 

There is a growing interest in the theme of financial participation of employees in their enterprises within Europe. The PEPPER II report (1996) of the European Commission, however, concludes that there is more  diversity than unity in the use of these employee financial participation schemes. PEPPER stands for Promotion of Employee Participation in Profit and Enterprise Results and is the acronym that the European Commission uses to denote financial participation schemes. There appears also to be a lack of empirical research on the application of different schemes, their success or failures, advantages or disadvantages.  Against this background the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions initiated a project to develop research on the application of employee financial participation. In the exploratory stage in 1999 the European Foundation commissioned to prepare a report on the state-of-the-art knowledge on employee financial participation. The final report is published jointly by the European Foundation and the European Commission (see Poutsma, 2001).

 

This contribution is based on that report and highlights the developments of policies on European and national level in particular. It presents an overview of the development of the views of the social partners.

 

The structure of the contribution is as follows: I start with a description of the variety and complexity of the phenomenon of financial participation. This is followed by a short description of the use and spread of financial participation in Europe. Next I present the possible reactions of governments and social partners followed by an overview of existing policies in the European Member States. I close the contribution by discussing the views of the social partners.

 

2. Financial participation

 

One of the arguments for putting financial participation into practice is to commit employees to the company and to develop an entrepreneurial attitude and enhance the co-operation between employees and management. In general, the motives at company level for putting financial participation into practice fall into four broad categories:

·        productivity increase;

·        enhancing flexibility of remuneration;

·        gaining tax advantages; and

·        providing employee benefits and hence an increased commitment from them

 

Some research also indicate more negative or defensive reasons for companies adopting these plans, such as:

·                    discouraging unionisation;

·                    used for take-over defence;

·                    financing companies in trouble.

 

The motives of the European Commission in promoting the practice of employee participation in profits and enterprise results is based on expectations of benefits for both employees and companies. The first PEPPER Report (1991) listed the following expectations, which were also presented as motives for the presentation of the Recommendation of the Commission in July 1992 and for commissioning the PEPPER II Report in 1996:

·      achieving a wider distribution of the wealth generated by the enterprises which the employed persons have helped to produce;

·      encouraging greater involvement of employees in the progress of their companies;

·      developing positive effects on motivation and productivity of employees;

·      enhancing the competitiveness of enterprises through wage flexibility; and

·      sustaining employment.

 

The two macro-level-oriented motives of the European Commission — a redistribution of wealth and sustaining employment — have proved important reasons for governments to develop policies for financial participation.

 

2.1 Financial participation schemes

 

Employee financial participation plans recently introduced or cur­rently developing in European countries generally are not new. There are a number of classifications in the literature that are more or less diffused into broad definitions of categories. However, there exists not an exclusive set of definitions. Moreover, schemes can become so complex (a combination plan for instance) that the employee is not able to figure out if he or she is participating in an ESOP or receives a thirteenth month’s pay.

 

The wide range of schemes can be divided into two main categories, which may or may not co‑exist and in some cases overlap: sharing in profits, and sharing in equity. These can be subdivided again into two broad categories which result into a broad generic classification of four categories (with some overlap in some situations) into which these plans fall:

·                    cash based profit-sharing,

·                    deferred profit-sharing,

·                    asset accumulation and employee share savings plans

·                    employee share ownership.

 

Typically for European policies is that employee financial partiucipation covers employee share ownership as well as profit sharing. The European Commission defines the term that way. In some countries these schemes are also interrelated and / or are covered with the same legislative framework.

 

2.2 Patterns of financial participation

The various forms of financial participation are combined in some countries and companies. The broad range of financial participation schemes could develop into a full range of patterns of financial participation schemes that could be typical for a European country under investigation. It can resolve into a pattern of measures taken by employers to meet desired objectives. The next scheme 1 presents a non-exhaustive pattern of financial participation in an attempt to generalise the subject for Europe. It is clear from this scheme that it covers quite a number of financial participation models that could be implemented, especially when we take into account that one scheme can resolve into another and that combinations are possible. For instance it can be embedded in retirement plans or investment funds in which not only employee shares are involved but also other contributions from profit sharing schemes. In fact some countries have specific tax advantages in resolving certain employee benefits derived from one scheme to another, for instance, from profit sharing into asset savings plans.

 

<Scheme 1 about here>

 

In other words under the heading of financial participation you will find quite some possibilities with different outcomes in terms of arrangements, rights and administration. It makes the picture rather complex. It is important to note that up till now we do not know how the different detailed forms of financial participation is distributed and arranged. From several sources we know that deferred profit sharing is the most widespread in Europe. Next scheme which is popular is stock options scheme. The typical ESOP comparable with the USA type is very rare in Europe.

 

Other important elements to be considered in our discussion (scheme 2) include:

·      whether schemes are broad-based or eligibility is only for certain categories of personnel;

·      whether schemes are dependent on the performance of the company or otherwise;

·      whether schemes are additional to basic wages or part of basic wages;

·      whether schemes are negotiated and agreed with employee representatives or otherwise;

·      whether schemes include more or less worker control rights;

·      whether schemes are based at single company level or multy unit level or developed at multi-company, multi-employer or sectoral levels or even national or international level.

 

<Scheme 2 about here>

 

Important for financial participation in the context of industrial relations are whether it is agreed and whether it allows some participation in decision making.

 

Agreement plan

In most cases management takes the initiative to implement a plan. There are schemes that came in existence through negotiations and in certain European countries approved schemes have the requirement to be agreed upon with employee representatives or employees directly.  

 

Voting rights and worker control

In case of share ownership, schemes might have developed where the participants have not full voting rights. Of course, this is guided by country legislation. In most cases there is no requirement that voting rights should be passed through on shares that are unallocated (In case of borrowed funds for purchasing the shares). Unallocated shares are ordinarily voted by the trustees. In case of publicly held companies and allocated shares the control of employee does not mean more than a small stockholder might have. Here the important question is as to what might go on in privately held companies. However, it might be expected that these firms do not extend voting rights beyond that called for by law.