Dear Norm:

Here is my analysis of the discussion of property presented by Mr. Medaille. Your question to him concerned where in the Summa did Saint Thomas state that property was prudential matter:

(NK4) Incidentally, where do you find in Summa Theologica that Aquinas stated that private property in land is "merely a prudential matter"? This seems to me to be contrary to the encycicals of Leo XIII, Pius XI and Pius XII on private property.

Mr. Medaille’s answer was as follows:

(JM5) In various places. One that springs to mind is ST II-II, 66, 3 r.1, "Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common and that nothing should be possessed as one's own: but because the division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but arose from human agreement which belongs to the positive law, as states above. Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto derived by human reason."

I believe Mr. Medaille’s interpretation of this passage is in error. He has taken a passage that contradicts the assertion that all goods should be owned in common and applies it to the question whether property is a natural right. These are two different questions, and the answer to one cannot be applied to the other without performing some rational exegesis of the text.

First, the passage refers not to the right TO property (“access”), but to the rights OF property (“use”). Communists assert that the universal right to property is satisfied when the state owns or controls the means of production. Saint Thomas states that this belief is in error. “Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common and that nothing should be possessed as one's own: but because the division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but arose from human agreement which belongs to the positive law, as states above.”

Mr. Medaille has confused access and use. Access to property is a natural right, as the popes, Saint Thomas and the Magisterium have asserted over and over. The use of property, which Saint Thomas refers to in this translation as “division of possession” and “ownership of possessions,” is also a natural right, but is governed by the demands of a particular time and place. It is therefore a matter of positive law, custom, tradition and so on, as Pius XII pointed out. Admittedly the passage is poorly translated. The phrase “ownership of possessions” is used by the translator, clearly not a lawyer, to mean what would ordinarily be stated as “use or exercise of possessions.” We need merely compare the text with other teachings, however, including those in the encyclicals, to grasp the proper sense.

Saint Thomas Aquinas (c. 1224 – 1274) states the teaching on property in this fashion in the Summa in the article immediately preceding the one quoted by Mr. Medaille. The passage quoted by Mr. Medaille must be understood in light of the earlier article, which directly addresses the issue he raised, i.e., whether property is a natural right or, as Saint Thomas puts it, “whether it is natural for man to possess external things?”

Whether it is natural for man to possess external things?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess external things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is God's. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper to God, according to Ps. 23:1, "The earth is the Lord's," etc. Therefore it is not natural for man to possess external things.

Objection 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man (Lk. 12:18), "I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my goods," says [*Hom. in Luc. xii, 18]: "Tell me: which are thine? where did you take them from and bring them into being?" Now whatever man possesses naturally, he can fittingly call his own. Therefore man does not naturally possess external things.

Objection 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. i [*De Fide, ad Gratianum, i, 1]) "dominion denotes power." But man has no power over external things, since he can work no change in their nature. Therefore the possession of external things is not natural to man.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 8:8): "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet."

I answer that, External things can be considered in two ways. First, as regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power of man, but only to the power of God Whose mere will all things obey. Secondly, as regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural dominion over external things, because, by his reason and will, he is able to use them for his own profit, as they were made on his account: for the imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as stated above (Question [64], Article [1]). It is by this argument that the Philosopher proves (Polit. i, 3) that the possession of external things is natural to man. Moreover, this natural dominion of man over other creatures, which is competent to man in respect of his reason wherein God's image resides, is shown forth in man's creation (Gn. 1:26) by the words: "Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea," etc.

Reply to Objection 1: God has sovereign dominion over all things: and He, according to His providence, directed certain things to the sustenance of man's body. For this reason man has a natural dominion over things, as regards the power to make use of them.

Reply to Objection 2: The rich man is reproved for deeming external things to belong to him principally, as though he had not received them from another, namely from God.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the dominion over external things as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to God alone, as stated above.

Whether it is lawful for a man to possess a thing as his own?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as his own. For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful. Now according to the natural law all things are common property: and the possession of property is contrary to this community of goods. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external thing to himself.

Objection 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man quoted above (Article [1], Objection [2]), says: "The rich who deem as their own property the common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who by going beforehand to the play prevent others from coming, and appropriate to themselves what is intended for common use." Now it would be unlawful to prevent others from obtaining possession of common goods. Therefore it is unlawful to appropriate to oneself what belongs to the community.

Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp.], and his words are quoted in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii., Can. Sicut hi.]: "Let no man call his own that which is common property": and by "common" he means external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it seems unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing to himself.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres., haer. 40): "The 'Apostolici' are those who with extreme arrogance have given themselves that name, because they do not admit into their communion persons who are married or possess anything of their own, such as both monks and clerics who in considerable number are to be found in the Catholic Church." Now the reason why these people are heretics was because severing themselves from the Church, they think that those who enjoy the use of the above things, which they themselves lack, have no hope of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to maintain that it is unlawful for a man to possess property.

I answer that, Two things are competent to man in respect of exterior things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and in this regard it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover this is necessary to human life for three reasons. First because every man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk the labor and leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens where there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one is contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division of the things possessed.

The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17,18): "Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others," etc.

Reply to Objection 1: Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common and that nothing should be possessed as one's own: but because the division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law, as stated above (Question [57], Articles [2],3). Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by human reason.

Reply to Objection 2: A man would not act unlawfully if by going beforehand to the play he prepared the way for others: but he acts unlawfully if by so doing he hinders others from going. In like manner a rich man does not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking possession of something which at first was common property, and gives others a share: but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately from using it. Hence Basil says (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18): "Why are you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience?"

Reply to Objection 3: When Ambrose says: "Let no man call his own that which is common," he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore he adds: "He who spends too much is a robber."

This was the very point on which John XXII issued the Bull “Vir Reprobus” (“That Evil Man”) in 1329, excommunicating the then-Father General of the Franciscans, Michael of Cesena. Michael of Cesena was asserting that access to property was not a natural right, and that use alone, determined by man’s law, was the sole justification for ownership. Michael of Cesena refused to accept correction and, in fact, circulated insulting pamphlets about the pope and Saint Thomas’ teachings on property. Deciding that the ultimate penalty should be invoked to bring the “reus” (“criminal”) to a more reasonable frame of mind, the pope excommunicated him, exhaustively detailing the justification for the traditional teaching that access to private property and the use thereof were natural rights. Paragraph 27 of the Bull, for example, states that “the heretic” is incorrect. Genesis explicitly gave personal, not common, ownership to Adam before our “first parent” was expelled from Eden. The right to property, antedating the Fall, is therefore a natural right. The use thereof, while subsequent to the Fall, was also natural, but determined by man’s social nature. Evidently the pope considered Michael of Cesena’s contradiction of the teachings of Saint Thomas sufficiently important to take such a drastic step.

And if it be asked whether that lordship was exclusive or common, it seems it must be said that, if at the time of the blessing spoken of above only Adam had been formed and not Eve (as the order of sacred Scripture indicates evidently, since that blessing was given to Adam when he was outside Paradise, but Eve was formed when Adam was put into the Garden, as is clear in Genesis, Chapters 1 and 2) — it seems that before Eve was formed the lordship of temporal things was exclusive to Adam, not common. Indeed it could not have been common, since at that time he was alone, and in respect of one who has never had any fellows nothing can be called common. This seems to be said explicitly in Ecclesiasticus 17[:1], where it is said: "God created man from the earth and made him according to his own likeness . . . He gave him power over things upon the earth and put fear of him upon all flesh, and he dominated the beasts and birds." From this it is clear that he dominated by himself. And from this it follows that for that time he had lordship by himself, because according to Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, Chapter 12, "From 'lordship' [dominium] is derived 'lord' [dominus], 'dominating,' and 'dominator.'" Accordingly, since it is said of Adam by himself that he dominated the beasts and birds, it follows that he was lord by himself. And that Eve had not then been formed is clear, because immediately after these words, "And he dominated the beasts and birds," it continues, "He created from him a helper like himself." Damascene, in Book II, last chapter, also seems to be of this opinion, where, speaking of our first parent, he says: "The creator made this human being as a male, appointed and gave to him his own divine grace, and through this put him in communion with himself. Accordingly he made him dominator, prophetic namer of the animals, as of his own gifts" — another reading has: "as of his own slaves." It continues: "He made from him his own helper," etc. [the “etc.” is in the original]

The matter is perhaps made most clear by Pius XII in his 1942 Christmas broadcast, “The Rights of Man.” The reference to the “fundamental obligation” to grant property, if possible, to all has been understood as an affirmation of property as a natural right. The “machinery” to which the pope refers is not, of course, technology, but to the marxist and socialist system that, going contrary to nature, denied the natural rights to and of property.

In one field of social life, where for a whole century there was agitation and bitter conflict, there is today a calm, at least on the surface. We speak of the vast and ever growing world of labor, of the immense army of workers, of breadwinners and dependents. If we consider the present with its wartime exigencies, as an admitted fact, then this calm may be called a necessary and reasonable demand; but if we look at the present situation in the light of justice, and with reference to a legitimately regulated labor movement, then the tranquillity will remain only apparent, until the scope of such a movement be attained.

Always moved by religious motives, the Church has condemned the various forms of Marxist Socialism; and she condemns them today, because it is her permanent right and duty to safeguard men from currents as thought and influences that jeopardize their external salvation. But the Church cannot ignore or overlook the fact that the worker in his efforts to better his lot, is opposed by a machinery which is not only not in accordance with nature, but is at variance with God's plan and with the purpose He had in creating the goods of earth.

In spite of the fact that the ways they followed were and are false and to be condemned, what man, and especially what priest or Christian, could remain deaf to the cries that rise from the depths and call for justice and a spirit of brotherly collaboration in a world ruled by a just God? Such silence would be culpable and unjustifiable before God, and contrary to the inspired teaching of the Apostle, who, while he inculcates the need of resolution in the fight against error, also knows that we must be full of sympathy for those who err, and open-minded in our understanding of their aspirations, hopes and motives.

When He blessed our first parents, God said: "Increase and multiply and fill the earth and subdue it." And to the first father of a family, He said later: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." The dignity of the human person, then, requires normally as a natural foundation of life the right to the use of the goods of the earth. To this right corresponds the fundamental obligation to grant private ownership of property, if possible, to all. Positive legislation regulating private ownership may change and more or less restrict its use. But if legislation is to play its part in the pacification of the community, it must prevent the worker, who is or will be a father of a family, from being condemned to an economic dependence and slavery which is irreconcilable with his rights as a person. Whether this slavery arises from the exploitation of private capital or from the power of the state, the result is the same. Indeed, under the pressure of a State which dominates all and controls the whole field of public and private life, even going into the realm of ideas and beliefs and of conscience, this lack of liberty can have the more serious consequences, as experience shows and proves.

Ironically, Mr. Medaille inadvertently appears to be taking the same position as Fr. Charles Curran in his book, Moral Theology, A Continuing Journey (1982), in which he states,

It appears there is still a tendency to give absolute rather than relative or instrumental value to the right of private property understood in the strict sense. GS [Gaudium et Spes] and PP [Populorum Progressio] made more clear the distinction between the generic right of dominion which belongs to all human beings and the right to private property in the strict sense. After affirming the principle of the universal destiny of the goods of creation, PP maintains that all other rights including that of private property and free commerce are to be subordinated to this principle.

Fr. Curran’s position is directly contrary to the traditional teaching of the Church regarding private property. It gives a socialist access to all property by everyone. Based on a faulty or twisted understanding of the fact that human beings are naturally more important than material things (Centesimus Annus, 54), this misinterpretation of the preeminence of man leads to the situation where everyone can exercise property in anyone else's material goods. To put it another way, it generates a claim that a right of participation exists in the property of others to the complete abrogation of the owners' rights of property. This confusion was clarified and the premise demolished by Fr. Matthew Habiger, Ph.D., O.S.B., in his book, Papal Teachings on Private Property (1990).

Curran mistakes [the pope's] insistence upon the absoluteness of man's right to own property, for the right of an owner to have absolute control over its use. [The pope] could not be more clear in keeping this distinction complete. Curran wishes to diminish the private dimension of all private property. The distinction which Curran does not make is that "the generic right of dominion" does not refer to ownership, but to use. The basic right of the individual to own property is left intact by these documents. The subordination of private property and free commerce to the universal destiny of the goods of creation in no way rules out private property; it only qualifies how the right is to be exercised. (p. 355)

As can be seen, then, confusion results from a failure to distinguish an individual's right to acquire property from that same individual's right to exercise the property he has acquired. Both are natural rights, but one is absolute, while the other is limited. From the time of the early Church Fathers there has been a clear distinction between "ownership" and "use." What is clear is that the generic right of dominion — the universal destination of the earth's goods — which refers to use, includes the right to acquire property by those who lack ownership of productive assets, although it mainly affects how property is to be exercised once it is acquired. The right to property is absolute, sacred and inviolable. That is, every single individual has the right to acquire property, and no one can be constrained from the opportunity that is his by right. The dominion over the world demonstrates the essential autonomy of man, albeit exercised within the common good.

It is common for many otherwise orthodox Catholic commentators to gloss over these distinctions, leaving room for such misinterpretations as that of Charles Curran, noted above, and Medaille.

A complete understanding of Catholic teaching on private property is a little more involved. First, it must clearly be understood that property is not a thing (as may be the source of Medaille’s confusion), but the bundle of rights a person has to or over a thing. Second, there are two “kinds” of property. The first is the right that everyone has to become an owner. This right is absolute and universal. No one may be deprived of the right to own property, any more than he may be deprived of life or liberty. This is a generic right, what the Popes have referred to as "the generic right of dominion," which was the phrase twisted by Curran and others. It does not apply to possessions that are already owned by others, except in extremely limited circumstances. It refers only to the fact that everyone and anyone must be allowed to become an owner, and that individuals, government, or society as a whole may not place or maintain barriers in the way of anyone who desires to become an owner. This right of property is inclusive.

The second kind of property consists of the bundle of rights that an owner has over his possessions. This property is the owner's rights of possession, control and disposal. These rights of property are exclusive, that is, the owner may exclude others from enjoying the fruits of ownership. This type of property is, by its very nature, limited by the demands of the common good. In general, an owner may not use his possessions to harm others or society. Unlike his right to become an owner, control over his possessions is not absolute, although, as Saint Thomas pointed out, it is also a natural right.

The error of the socialists is to deny the first kind of property. By abolishing private property, they reject the concept that everyone has the right to become an owner. The error of the capitalists is to deny the second kind of property. By rejecting any limitation on the right of an owner to do as he pleases with what he owns, they also, as Chesterton remarks in "The Enemies of Property" (The Outline of Sanity), negate all property.

We also see this also in reference to the arguments over whether or not the “Living Wage” is a natural right and whether or not it is “absolute.” Like the exercise (“use”) of property, Catholic teaching holds that the right to a living wage is a natural right — but it is neither absolute nor applicable in all situations to all people. This is because income, however derived, is necessary for the support of life, and life is an absolute and natural right.

How that income is derived, however, is a matter of prudence, custom, law and tradition, although Church teaching consistently places mixing one’s labor with what one owns over mixing one’s labor with that which belongs to another. That is, it is better to work your own land, than be paid to work that of another, although both actions are legitimate and come under natural law. As Saint Paul said in another context, it is good to be married, but better to be celibate. One practice does not negate the legitimacy of the other, although a superficial commentator might presume so. The mere exercise of property is a natural right, but the specifics are governed by positive law, with the single caveat, as Pius XI pointed out, that civil authority may not so define the exercise of property as to negate it. That would be to violate a natural right implicitly instead of explicitly.

Within the wage system, the propertyless employee who has no other source of income save for his job is absolutely dependent on his employer, whether he is an apprentice with formal indentures, or a corporate executive paid in the six-figures. His income, his means of sustaining his life and that of his own dependents, is absolutely tied to his employer. This is recognized by one of the most popular of proponents of the living wage, early in the last century, Rev. John A. Ryan, in his book, A Living Wage (1906).

The source of natural rights is the dignity of the human person, while their scope is determined by the person's essential needs. A man's natural rights are as many and as extensive as are the liberties, opportunities and possessions that are required for the reasonable maintenance and development of his personality. They may all be reduced to the right to a reasonable amount of external liberty of action. Some of them, for instance, the right to live and the right to marry, are original and primary, inhering in all persons of whatever condition; others are derived and secondary, occasioned and determined by the particular circumstances of particular persons. To the latter class belongs the right to a Living Wage. It is not an original and universal right; for the receiving of wages supposes that form of industrial organization known as the wage system, which has not always existed and is not essential to human welfare. Even today there are millions of men who get their living otherwise than by wages, and who, therefore, have no juridical title to wages of any kind or amount. The right to a Living Wage is evidently a derived right which is measured and determined by existing social and industrial institutions. [pp. 67 – 68]

In short, the right to property is a natural right, and is absolute. The exercise of property is also a natural right, but the specifics of its exercise are defined by current conditions and social needs. Specifics concerning the exercise of property thus fall under the purview of civil authority, but only to the extent that civil authority does not define property out of existence by making its legitimate and necessary exercise impossible.

I hope this answers your question.

Yours,

Michael D. Greaney

Director of Research

Center for Economic and Social Justice