Issues from 'Beating the Bottom Line'

["Vic Thorpe" <just.solutions@pandora.be>]

I've had some surprised private feedback about the item 'Beating the Bottom
Line' that I posted to the discussion baord.  Am I really promoting the
'partnerhsip' ideas that are an obvious part of that discussion?

No, I'm not!

What I like about the article is that it does raise a number of issues that
trade unionists need to be aware of when approaching the discussion on
worker ownership.

1.  First off, it starts with the Hathaway shirt example - a company rescued
from corporate vampirism by more principled private investment.  Note,
however, the new owner puts his success down to the efforts of the
workforce.  That being the case, why do we need the middle man?  Why could
the workers themselves - who made it work for the new employer - equally
well have made it work for themselves and pocketed the loose change?  Could
UNITE maybe have played a new role in leading that change of attitude?

2.   Hansen International is a similar case (though probably more dubious).
Both are examples of where new management turned round operations that were
under the hammer, while attributing their success to workforce effort - and
still making a profit.  So it is clear that many operations that are closed
need not be.  They - and the jobs associated with them - can be saved by the
applied skills and knowledge of the workforce.  Why does the organisation of
that effort need to be farmed out when we have our own organisations - our
unions - who could act more directly in our interest?

3.  The Double Eagle shipyard example shows 'big labor' (as the Americans
call national-level involvement) acting together by investing several union
pension funds in retaining jobs.  A defensive response to job loss and to
the anti-union activity of companies that are in large part sustained by
workers' pension funds managed by Wall Street.  As Leo Gerard, Vice
President of the US Steelworkers, says "That's our money and we're tired of
getting beat over the head with it".

4.  The Canadian Solidarity Pension Fund shows a more pro-active approach to
direct investment of workers' money.  However, it is to some extent still a
professionally-managed fund - only this time managed by the unoin's
professionals.  Still a step away from direct worker-ownership, however -
but getting there.

5.  Northwest Airlines is a better example of worker buy-in.  Part defensive
(to stave off bankruptcy) and part reconstructive (getting 30 per cent of
the shares and three worker directors on the board), it begins to show a way
that labor can become directly involved in taking control of the forward
momentum of industry.  But it stops short of going the whole way.  30 per
cent is still a minority shareholding and professional management still
appears to hold the reins.  It also shows some other benefits to the union,
however, in the operation of the Farm Out Committee - to give work to union
run operations in preference to non-union.

6.  The last item - on the social security system in Netherlands that seems
to encourage temporary work contracts - is a warning.  Is a large part of
the enthusiasm for 'worker involvement' and 'participation' or 'partnership'
in Europe just a way to lull workers into accepting the unacceptable?

None of the examples in this piece measure up to what would be my idea of a
full-blooded worker ownership strategy.  But the examples that are chosen
and the way that they are presented does suggest that there is a wide open
opportunity for labor to come back with a carefully devised program for
advancing full worker ownership.

Any comments?

Vic Thorpe