Kurland v. Turnbull

["Norman G. Kurland" <thirdway@cesj.org>]

Dear Ownership People,

For the developing debate on the practical value of binary economic theory (it allows for holistic rather than piecemeal problem-solving), I thought it might be useful to send you the following e-mail I received from Thomas Brandt on January 31st and my response to him on of February 5th.

Cheers,
Norm Kurland

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Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2000 18:37:35 -1000
 From: "Thomas Brandt" <tbrandt@dbedt.hawaii.gov>
 To: <sturnbull@mba1963.hbs.edu>, <homestead@cog.kent.edu>,
<thirdway@cesj.org>
  Subject: Kurland v. Turnbull

To Mr. Turnbull and Mr. Kurland:

I want to make sure I understand the essence of your disagreement, so I would
appreciate it if you could comment on the following summary of my understanding.
 I apologize to both of you and everyone else if I'm the only one who doesn't
grasp this.

My impression is that your differences boil down to this:

Mr. Turnbull feels property ownership should be time-limited like patents, but
advocates only tax  incentives--rather than coercion/confiscation--to broaden
ownership of existing property and capital (as well as new capital created by
future econ growth and money supply expansion).

Mr. Kurland thinks ownership of existing property and capital should remain
inviolable (except for incentives to encourage ESOPs and other Kelsonian
alternatives e.g. CSOP, RECOP, etc??), and that COG efforts should focus
exclusively on broadening ownership of capital created by future econ growth and
money supply expansion.

Most puzzling to me is Mr. Kurland's condemnation of Mr. Turnbull's advocacy of
using the tax system to induce owners of global corporations to sunset their
ownership rights.  In addition to ESOP tax incentives (which I thought Mr.
Kurland supported), Mr. Kurland also advocates elimination of the double tax on
corporate profits, making dividends deductible at the corporate level and tax
deferred, and inheritance law reforms.  I see little difference in the
ostensible level of "coercion" in either strategy.  Both seem more feasible and
"voluntary" to me than efforts to democratize the money supply (as desirable as
that may be).

If I've oversimplified or otherwise distorted your positions, please let me
know.  If not, it seems your similarities greatly exceed your differences.

Mahalo and Aloha!

---

Date: 05 February 2000
To: "Brandt, Thomas" <tbrandt@dbedt.hawaii.gov>
From:  Norm Kurland
Subject: Re: Kurland vs. Turnbull

Dear Tom,

Thanks for your letter requesting clarification of my position.

I think Shann is wrong in seeking the right end--democratization of
capital--by the means of changing the rules of property.  That approach
will not unite haves and have-nots, and will be opposed by the many
have-nots who want to become haves.

On the other hand, we both advocate the democratization of capital
credit and a tax system that encourages our common goal, although we
differ on the specific principles for achieving that goal.  To better
understand what I'm proposing in the way of restructuring the national
tax system, please click on
http://www.cesj.org/library/reforms/taxsystems/taxjustice.html.

You will see that the Kelsonian system, based on long-standing
principles of economic justice, offered a radically simple and
easily-administered system for collecting public revenues, while at the
same time meeting Social Security and Medicare obligations, etc. but in
ways that encourage broad-based ownership and second incomes for the
non-rich people.  We would restructure the tax system to conform to
these principles of economic justice, which also represent the moral
foundation for binary growth theory.

However, you'll also see why we carefully avoid using the tax system for
redistributing incomes and still allow the poor to avoid paying any
taxes and making it possible for the appropriations process to subsidize
the poor (until they acquire second incomes from Capital Homesteading
stakes) through the appropriations process.  You'll also note that our
tax system does not encourage ESOPs, etc. through "tax subsidies" or
"redistributive taxation" both on moral, efficiency and political
grounds.  We think it's inherently divisive and counter-productive to
design a system based on the redistribution of existing income or
redistribution of existing wealth.  That's what brought about the
taxpayers' revolt starting in the 1970s.

Instead, we advocate the redistribution of future ownership
opportunities, meaning access to ownership and profits from new capital
and the transfer of existing capital when it becomes sold or the owner
dies.  (In other words, no laws should be supported that do not level
the playing field for future ownership opportunities, not tip it one way
or the other; the only involuntary and unmanipulated time limit on
ownership rights should be death, since obviously the former owner is no
longer a person who needs capital to meet his needs.)

No, I am not limiting our focus to future capital formation.  The
voluntary transfer of assets and death represent opportunities for the
democratization of existing assets under a national ownership strategy
and the Capital Homestead Act.  Please click on
http://www.cesj.org/library/homestead-national/cha-full.pdf to see the
full array of  Kelsonians reforms to democratize capital.

After you've read these pieces I look forward to your comments.

Norm Kurland