Re: Quid Pro Quo amendment

["David Spitzley" <dspitzle@gw.wash.k12.mi.us>]

I think the basic problem with the quid-pro-quo proposal is that it attempts to 
promote a particular public policy through a constitutional amendment.  In the 
past I've mentioned to Deb my general distaste for amending the constitution as 
a political strategy, but as a more practical matter, constitutional amendments 
have two major problems which more direct legislative tools avoid: they are 
flexible, and they are fixed.  

A good amendment says something general about how government should operate, 
but it doesn't say much about how the government should handle specific 
situations.  The proposed amendment language is: "In exchange for government 
largesse (from every level of government) to businesses require governments to 
provide a quid pro quo at fair market value to the common weal."  This 
amendment might very well be a good idea; unfortunately, it is difficult to 
predict how it would be interpreted.  Many existing tax abatement programs 
might pass by unaffected based on increased tax revenues from employees of the 
benefiting corporations.  Keep in mind that the true test of the U.S. 
Constitution comes at the Supreme Court; I wouldn't trust the Republican 
prunefaces we keep getting stuck with to rule the way we want in evaluating the 
amendment (sorry to any Republicans out there...)

The flip side of the flexibility of amendments is their static nature.  The 
text of an amendment is beyond the reach of legislators; that is, of course, 
the point.  However, capital democratization is such an immature concept (even 
given the extensive experience of the ESOP movement) that it is entirely 
possible that, whatever form a putative quid-pro-quo amendment might take,  the 
language of the amendment would wind up being inimical to public policy 
innovation on the subject.  For example, what would such an amendment do to 
Kelsonian ideas of full-payout of corporate earnings, free of corporate income 
tax?  Does it make sense that a city government would be unable to give 
preferential tax treatment to an already democratically-owned local business, 
where the electorate and the business owners are nearly the same group?  While 
getting laws passed in individual poltical arenas will be time consuming, at 
least it is possible to change them as new and better ideas come along; once 
you amend the constitution, you're stuck with it.

You know, if this amendment came up on the ballot in Michigan, and would only 
apply to the state constitution, I'd probably go for it; state constitutions 
are much easier to fix if we break them.  When it comes to the Federal level, 
however, I would be uncomfortable with this amendment proposal.  On the other 
hand, as a general vision of public policy it's pretty potent.  Even if COG 
decides against supporting it as a constitutional amendment, it might be worth 
promoting the concept of "Share Ownership Quid Pro Quo"  within the public 
policy and community organizing fields as a general strategy to balance 
corporate welfare and tax abatements.

Anyway, I hope my criticisms are helpful; I know they probably aren't what Deb 
wanted to hear, but I suppose that's the point.